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HOW QUI TAM ACTIONS COULD FIGHT
PUBLIC CORRUPTION
Aaron R. Petty*
This Note argues that public corruption at the state and local levels is a serious
problem throughout the United States. Because public corruption decreases confi-
dence in the democratic system at all levels of government, a strong response is
necessary. Due to difficulties inherent in the deterrence, detection, and prosecution
of state and local corruption, innovative methods to respond to this problem are
needed. The author argues that amending the federal criminal statutes most com-
monly used to prosecute state and local public corruption, to allow a private
citizen to bring a qui tam civil action against the public official for violations of
those criminal statutes, would contribute substantially to the deterrence, detection,
and prosecution of public corruption.
"Power corrupts the few, while weakness corrupts the many.
-Eric Hoffer'
INTRODUCTION
Honest government is the cornerstone of democracy. When a
public official abuses a position of trust, it undermines the founda-
tion upon which our society is built. Combating public corruption
should therefore be a priority at all levels of government. The
question is "How?" Because it is nearly always the case that more
than one individual is involved in corrupt official activity (e.g. a
bribe-giver and a bribe-taker), obtaining first-hand knowledge of
public corruption is, or should be, an important public goal. By
exploiting this knowledge-by giving a voice to those who may not
be powerful enough to challenge a public official-prosecutors
may be able to improve detection and prosecution of public cor-
ruption, which in turn will also improve general deterrence among
public officials.
* B.A., 2004, Northwestern University; J.D., expected 2007, University of Michigan
Law School; Managing Article Editor, University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform. The author
would like to thank his fiancfe, Rachel Warnick, and his family for their unwavering support
and encouragement throughout the life of this project.
1. ERIC HOFFER, THE ORDEAL OF CHANGE 14 (1952).
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This Note proposes that federal criminal statutes commonly
used to prosecute state and local officials for public corruption
should be amended to include a qui tam cause of action similar to
that found in the False Claims Act. Part I will illustrate the perva-
sive and current problem of public corruption in the United States
at the state and local levels. Part II will introduce the qui tam ac-
tion, specifically as it exists and has been used under the False
Claims Act. Qui tam statutes grant standing to private parties to sue
in the name of the government for specified wrongs against the
government. A successful party is then entitled to a share of the
government's recovery, as well as statutory damages. Part III will
argue that the addition of a qui tam cause of action against state
and local officials to certain federal criminal statutes would provide
a significant benefit to the public by aiding in the deterrence, de-
tection and prosecution of those crimes. Part IV will address
concerns raised by this proposal, including federalism issues, the
measurement of damages, and the accrual of private benefits from
knowledge gained as a public official. This Note concludes that
such concerns, although important, are outweighed by the poten-
tial benefits offered by the proposed amendments and the
overriding necessity of minimizing public corruption.
I. PUBLIC CORRUPTION
Public corruption is number four on the FBI's list of top ten pri-
orities, following only terrorism, espionage, and cybercrimes.2 It
holds this position of prominence in large part because it "strikes
at the core of what our country's [sic] about. Our democracy de-
pends on a healthy, efficient, and ethical government-whether it's
in the courtroom or the halls of Congress."3 Additionally, public
corruption can have significant specific consequences. For in-
stance, corruption can directly impact national security if state
employees are bribed for fake IDs and licenses.4 But public corrup-
2. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Public Corruption, http://www.fbi.gov/hq/cid/
pubcorrupt/pubcorrupt.htm (last visited July 2, 2006) (on file with the University of Michi-
gan Journal of Law Reform). The term "public corruption," as used in this Note, means a
criminal breach of trust or abuse of power by a public official.
3. Dan O'Brien, Cracking Down on Public Corruption, June 20, 2005, http://
www.fbi.gov/page2/juneO5/obrienO62005.htm (on file with the University of Michigan




tion also has a broad reach; it can create economic inefficiencies 5
for which the public foots the bill. 6 Because of its significant poten-
tial economic and political impact on a national scale, public
corruption at the state and local level is a proper target of federal
prosecutors. While there is unfortunately no shortage of potential
cases to prosecute, the difficulties inherent in prosecuting public
corruption suggests that supplementary measures may be useful in
deterring, detecting, and prosecuting public corruption.
A. State-level Corruption
On December 17, 2003, George Ryan was indicted as the sixty-
sixth defendant in Operation Safe Road on charges of racketeer-
ing, conspiracy, mail fraud, tax fraud, and making false statements
to federal investigators during his terms as the Illinois Secretary of
State and later Governor of Illinois.7 Ryan allegedly received illegal
cash payments, gifts, vacations, personal services, and loans totaling
more than $167,000 in exchange for the performance of official
government acts, including awarding lucrative contracts and
leases.s Additionally, the government alleged that Ryan used state
resources for his and his family's personal benefit, his campaign
organization, and some of his associates, and that Ryan lied to fed-
eral agents about facts material to their investigation. 9
The racketeering charge alleged that Ryan and others were en-
gaged in a pattern of racketeering activity that included "multiple
acts of mail fraud, money laundering, extortion, state bribery and
obstruction of justice," defrauding the people and the state of Illi-
nois of money, property, and the honest services of Ryan in his
5. See SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT: CAUSES CONSE-
QUENCES, AND REFORM 4 (1999); Posting of Richard A. Posner to The Becker-Posner
Blog, http://www.becker-posner blog.com/archives/2005/09/corruption-pos.html (Sept. 3,
2005).
6. ROSE-AcKERMAN, supra note 5, at 4. The argument that is sometimes made, that
corruption (political patronage, in particular) is tolerated because it works better than hon-
est government, is beyond the scope of this Note. This Note will proceed on the assumption
that public corruption, writ large, is bad for society, primarily because it is anti-democratic.
7. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, U.S. Indicts Former Illinois Gov. George Ryan
for Alleged Public Corruption During Terms as Secretary of State and Governor 1 (Dec. 17,
2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/iln/pr/chicago/2003/prl21703_01.pdf (on
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official capacity, as well as those of other officials.10 The mail fraud
allegations suggested that associates were paid from proceeds ob-
tained by vendors doing business with the State of Illinois; that
Ryan received prohibited cash and gifts, vacation benefits, and
loan services; and that during the time that Ryan was accepting
financial benefits, some of his associates were provided with mate-
rial nonpublic information relating to official decisions and
participation in the official decision-making process, resulting in
financial benefit to those associates."
The indictment also alleged that Ryan made false statements to
federal investigators on three separate occasions concerning vaca-
tions, state leases, appointments to state commissions, his financial
relationship with co-defendant businessman Lawrence Warner, and
campaign contributions." Ryan was also charged with income tax
fraud, in that he corruptly obstructed and impeded the Internal
Revenue Service from making a correct determination of his in-
come and from collecting the taxes and penalties he owed the
government.'3 Specifically, the government alleged that Ryan used
funds from his campaign organization to pay for his own and his
family members' personal expenses, and for the benefit of third
parties; that he diverted funds to conceal his true income, and
caused his campaign funds to issue paychecks, which were actually
gifts; and that he deposited campaign contributions into his per-
sonal account without reporting them.'
4
Some of the official actions taken by Ryan for the benefit of
Warner included a contract for a company he was involved with,
American Decal, to manufacture and print vehicle registration
stickers that are required on all cars registered in Illinois; a con-
tract for title laminates 6 currently held by a different vendor to be
awarded to American Decal; 7 purchase of IBM computers at the
Secretary of State's office for which Warner received nearly $1 mil-
lion under an existing contract with IBM; awarding of contracts
for heating and cooling in state government buildings to a com-
pany in which Warner was later granted a percentage of the
10. Id. at 4.
11. Id. at 6-13.
12. Id. at 13-14.
13. Id. at 14.
14. Id. at 15-16.
15. Id. at8.
16. Id. A title laminate is a physical security device attached to title documents for cars.
Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 8--9.
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contract revenues; 9 and the execution of three leases at properties
in which Warner stood to profit if leased by the Secretary of State's
office. °
At the conclusion of a six-month trial, on April 17, 2006 Gover-
nor Ryan was convicted on all eighteen counts against him.21
Warner was likewise convicted on each of the twelve counts that he
22 23was facing. Ryan was sentenced to six and a half years in prison.
In contrast to Governor Ryan's well-publicized trial for mail
fraud, Rhode Island State Senator John Celona pleaded guilty to
three counts of honest services mail fraud24 on August 25, 2005
amidst minimal fanfare.5 Senator Celona admitted that he had ac-
cepted money and gifts from corporations that had interests in
pending legislation and that he had used his official position
fraudulently to support the interests of those organizations. 6 Spe-
cifically, Celona admitted to three schemes: one involving a
medical and assisted living center, another involving a pharmacy,
and a third involving a health insurance company and a communi-
21cations company.
Between 1998 and 2003, the medical center paid Celona
$260,683.29 In exchange, Celona opposed legislation that would
require the center's directors to step down if it changed from a
non-profit to a for-profit center, he opposed legislation that would
have required non-profit organizations to make payments in lieu of
taxes, and he intervened in contract disputes the center had with
29
third parties.
Before Celona began consulting with the pharmacy, he sup-
ported "pharmacy freedom of choice" legislation, which the
pharmacy industry opposed.30 In 2000, after Celona began collecting
what eventually totaled $45,000 in consulting fees, he no longer
19. Id. at 9-10.
20. Id. at 10.
21. Associated Press, Guilty, CHi. TRiB., Apr. 18, 2006, at 6.
22. Id.
23. Matt O'Connor & Rudolph Bush, Ryan Gets 6 1/2 Years, CH. TRHB., Sept. 7, 2006 at 1.
24. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1346 (2000).
25. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Former Senator John Celona Pleads Guilty to
Federal Fraud Charges 1 (Aug. 25, 2005), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/ri/
pressrelease/aug2005/celona-plea.pdf (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of
Law Reform).
26. Id.
27. Id. The identities of the medical center, pharmacy, health insurer, and communica-
tions company were never publicly disclosed. Id.
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supported the legislation.3' In addition, he opposed legislation that
would have allowed Canadian pharmacies to be licensed in Rhode
Island, sponsored legislation, that would have required manufac-
turers to accept returns from distributors such as the pharmacy,
and accepted a free trip to a charity golf tournament in San Diego
in 2003.32
In 2002, the health insurer began paying the communications
company to produce a cable television show for Celona.33 In re-
turn, he supported a bill that would allow insurers greater
flexibility in designing their health benefits plans, and opposed a
bill regulating investments by a non-profit dental insurer.34
Senator Celona's sentencing was scheduled for May 11, 2006.35
When Ohio Governor Bob Taft took office in 1999, he required
his appointees to undergo ethics training.36 In May 2005, Taft said
that public employees "can enjoy entertainment, such as golf or
dining out, with persons working for a regulated company, or one
doing business with the state, only if they fully pay their own way. 01
Three months later, on August 17, 2005, Taft was charged with four
misdemeanor counts for failing to report gifts of golf and hockey
outings paid for by friends, lobbyists, and businessmen. 38 The gifts
were reportedly worth close to $5,800. 3' The scandal "has ex-
panded into other areas and includes charges of cover-up,
cronyism and ethical lapses."4° Ohio Representative Chris Redfern
said, "It's about a pay-to-play system that has been going on in Ohio
for years .... Since I got here in 1999, it's been an open secret that
if you contribute money, you get the state jobs you want and the
state contracts you want."
4'
Most recently, a thirty-count indictment was returned on Octo-
ber 27, 2005 against former Alabama Governor Don Siegelman,
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 3.
34. Id.
35. Press Release, U.S. Dep't ofJustice, Roger Williams Medical Center and Three Ex-
ecutives Are Charged with Federal Fraud Charges 4 (Jan. 5, 2006), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/ri/pressrelease/jan2006/rwuindict.pdf (on file with the
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
36. TimJones, Ohio GovernorIs ChargedAs Scandal Grows, CHI. TkIB., Aug. 18, 2005, available
at http://www.chicagotribune.com/news.nafonworld.chi-0508180156augl8,1,933533.story?coll=
chi-newsnationworld-hed (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
37. Id.
38. Dennis Cauchon, Rare-Coin Deal Buys Scandal for Ohio Governor, USA TODAY, Aug.
16, 2005, at 3A; Jones, supra note 36.
39. Jones, supra note 36.
40. Cauchon, supra note 38.
41. Id.
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along with an aide, former HealthSouth executive Richard Scrushy,
and another state official.42 Siegelman was charged with racketeer-
ing, honest services wire and mail fraud, obstruction of justice,
bribery and Hobbs Act extortion.43 In particular, the government
alleged that Siegelman extorted close to $300,000 from individuals
under threats of harming their business interests with the state.4
Additionally, he was charged with racketeering, conspiracy, and
bribery in connection with Scrushy's appointment to the Alabama
Certificate of Need Review BoardY.
B. Local Corruption
Chicago is known for many things: its famous skyline, its lake-
front, and its centuries-old tradition of corruption in local
government.4 On July 18, 2005, two City of Chicago officials were
arrested on charges of mail fraud.47 Robert Sorich, a high-ranking
official in the Mayor's Intergovernmental Affairs (IGA) Office, and
Patrick Slattery, Director of Staff Services in the Department of
Streets and Sanitation, were alleged to have participated in a
scheme directed by Sorich, in which the interview, selection, and
promotion process for certain city jobs was manipulated to the ad-
vantage of those candidates favored by high-ranking city officials.4 8
The government alleged that an individual who had connections
to political organizations, had volunteered to work on campaigns
or had certain union affiliations would often be selected for
42. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Former Alabama Governor Don Siegelman
and Others Indicted in Racketeering, Bribery and Extortion Conspiracy (Oct. 27, 2005),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/alm/Press/Siegelman-indictment.htm (on file with




46. See generallyJAMEs L. MERRINER, GRAFTERS AND Goo Coos: CORRUPTION AND RE-
FORM IN CHICAGO, 1833-2003 (2004) (describing the history of political corruption in
Chicago). Of course, down-staters are quick to point out that corruption in Illinois is not
limited to Chicago and Springfield. See Jim Suhr & Jan Dennis, Public Corruption Not Just in
State's Big Cities, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Aug. 26, 2005, at 57. Although Chicago City Hall and the
State House capture the lion's share of the headlines, political corruption is also significant
in smaller places like East St. Louis and Cairo, Illinois. Id.
47. Press Release, U.S. Dep't ofJustice, U.S. Charges Two City of Chicago Officials with
Fraudulently Rigging Hiring and Promotions 1 (July 18, 2005), available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/usao/iln/pr/chicago/2005/prO718_Ol.pdf (on file with the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
48. Id.
857
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employment or promotion over other applicants with equal or su-
perior qualifications. 49 Those who were pre-selected would receive
inflated interview scores, or would sit for "sham interviews.",
50
Under an existing federal consent decree known as the Shakman
decree,5' the City of Chicago is prohibited from making hiring and
promotion decisions on the basis of political considerations for all
but approximately 1,000 managerial and policy positions of the
city's roughly 38,000 total jobs.5 Affidavits of cooperating witnesses,
which include commissioners of city departments, describe IGA's
role in hiring and promotions for Shakman-covered positions.53
The U.S. Attorney's Office alleged that IGA pre-determined who
would receive a job or a promotion before interviews were con-
ducted; that a city official received a document called "the blessed
list," which he understood to be the names of individuals the
Mayor's Office wanted to employ; that documents recovered in a
raid of City Hall revealed pre-selected winners ofjobs alongside the
political organization or union sponsor they were associated with;
and that when a city official "complained to Sorich that a particular
pre-selected applicant was 'a drunk,' Sorich replied, 'Do the best
you can with him.' ,4 One pre-selected candidate died before in-
terviews were conducted, yet he was listed as one of the individuals
who would be hired. Another pre-selected candidate was given the
highest interview rating possible, yet he was on active military duty
in Iraq when the interview would have taken place.55
Mayor Richard M. Daley was interviewed by the U.S. Attorney's
Office in August 2005.56 Although no charges have been filed
against him, he appeared visibly shaken at a news conference after
the questioning.57 In September 2005, indictments were returned
against both Sorich and Slattery, as well as Timothy McCarthy, a
former assistant to Sorich and an interviewer in the Department of
Aviation; John Sullivan, a former Deputy Commissioner of Streets
and Sanitation who was charged with mail fraud and making false
statements, and Daniel Katalinic, also a former Deputy Commis-
49. Id. at 2.
50. Id.
51. Shakman v. Democratic Org. of Cook County, 569 F. Supp. 177, 178-83 (N.D. Il1.
1983). The Shakman decree was a permanent injunction binding the City of Chicago and
other entities enforcing decisions that prohibited patronage in public employment. See id. at
178-79.
52. Press Release, U.S. Dep't ofJustice, supra note 47, at 3.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 5.
55. Id. at 5--6.




sioner of Streets and Sanitation, who was charged with mail fraud.58
Katalinic is the thirty-sixth defendant facing charges as a result of
the U.S. Attorney's investigation into the City of Chicago's Hired
Truck Program. 9 Between May and September 2005, eight mem-
bers of Mayor Daley's cabinet either resigned or were fired.60 In
July 2006, Sorich, Slattery, McCarthy, and Sullivan were convicted
for their participation in the patronage machine.61 Although the
powers of the city's new inspector general have been expanded and
an anonymous hotline to report wrongdoing has been established,
there is still little incentive for whistleblowers to come forward. 62
Although Chicago City Hall has traditionally been rumored to
be corrupt, in recent years, the administration of Mayor Vincent
"Buddy" Cianci, Jr., in Providence, Rhode Island has certainly been
more flagrantly criminal. On April 2, 2001, a federal grand jury
indicted Cianci and four associates on racketeering charges for
running the city of Providence as a criminal enterprise.6 6 Another
associate was charged with bribery.64 The indictment alleged that
Cianci used his office to obtain cash and campaign contributions
from city employees and contractors, and that those who paid or
otherwise complied with his requests were given benefits including
leases, contracts, employment, promotions, business, or other
benefits.
65
Between 1991 and 1999, Mayor Cianci and associates obtained
$250,000 in campaign contributions from members of the
Providence Towing Association.6 In return, those who donated
were listed on the Tow List, from which the Providence Police
Department would select tow companies to tow cars. 7 In 1991, a
realty company leased property to the Providence School
58. Anna Johnson, Five Chicago Officials Charged in Probe, FREEREPUBLICCOM, Sept. 22,
2005, available at http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1489651/posts (on file with
the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
59. Id.
60. City Hall Changes Planned, DETROIT FREE PREss, Sept. 28, 2005, at A5.
61. Rudolph Bush & Dan Mihalopoulos, DaleyJobs Chief Guilty, CHI. TRIB., July 7, 2006,
at 1. Sorich was convicted of two counts of mail fraud and acquitted of two counts of mail
fraud; McCarthy was convicted of two counts of mail fraud; Slattery was convicted of one
count of mail fraud; and Sullivan was convicted of one count of making false statements to
federal agents and acquitted of another count of making false statements. Id.
62. City Hall Changes Planned, supra note 60, at A5.
63. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, RICO Indictments (Apr. 2, 2001), available at
http://www.turnto10.com/plunderdome/lI126375/detail.html (on file with the University




67. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't ofJustice, supra note 63.
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Department.68 In return, some of the proceeds from the lease were
paid back to Cianci and an associate.69 In 1998, Mayor Cianci and
two associates extorted $15,000 from the heirs of an estate, in
return for reducing back taxes.70 Mayor Cianci was also charged
with other acts of extortion, bribery, and fraud.7
In total, Mayor Cianci was charged with RICO, RICO conspir-
acy, seven criminal RICO acts, three counts of Hobbs Act
7
1
extortion, two counts of federal bribery conspiracy and federal
bribery, two counts each of mail fraud and witness tampering, one
count of mail fraud conspiracy and one count of attempted extor-• 74
tion. Cianci was found guilty on one count of racketeering
conspiracy and sentenced to sixty-four months in prison.
5
Another long-running investigation has recently seen its seventh
and eighth defendants convicted, although neither is a public offi-
cial. 76 Cleveland businessman Nate Gray and New Orleans
businessman Gilbert Jackson were convicted in the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of Ohio on multiple felony counts
relating to their illegal dealings with public officials. Gray was
convicted on thirty-six felony counts, including one count of RICO
conspiracy, three counts of Hobbs Act conspiracy, twelve counts of
Hobbs Act extortion, thirteen counts of mail fraud, and seven
counts of wire fraud. Jackson was convicted on eight similar fel-
ony counts, including RICO conspiracy, Hobbs Act conspiracy,
Hobbs Act extortion, mail fraud and wire fraud.79 Gray is a high
school graduate who began his business career operating a gas sta-
tion at the age of twenty-two.8 ° By age forty-seven, prosecutors
alleged that he was directing a large and growing enterprise in





72. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-63
(2000).
73. See 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2000).
74. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't ofJustice, supra note 63.
75. Tracy Breton, Operation Plunder Dome, PROVIDENCEJ.,June 17, 2005, at Al.
76. Two More Convicted in Cleveland Corruption Case, http://lawprofessors.typepad.
com/whitecollarcrimeblog/2005/08/twomoreconvic.html (Aug. 20, 2005).
77. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice (Aug. 18. 2005), available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/usao/ohn/news/18August2005.htm (on file with the University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Steve LuttnerJury Convicts Gray in 2nd Trial PLAIN DEALER, Aug. 18, 2005, at Al.
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and award contracts to companies that had hired him as a "con-
sultant," most notably in Houston and the greater Cleveland area."'
Several public officials have already been convicted. Emanuel
Onunwor, former mayor of East Cleveland, was convicted on
twenty-two counts, including RICO conspiracy, Hobbs Act extor-
tion, mail fraud, bankruptcy fraud, and filing false tax returns."
Onunwor was sentenced to 108 months imprisonment and restitu-
tion to the City of East Cleveland of over $5 million. Monique
McGilbra, former Director of Building Services for the City of
Houston was sentenced to 36 months imprisonment, two years su-
pervised release, $5,000 fine and $200 special assessment for her
guilty plea to conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud. 3 Oliver
Spellman, former Chief of Staff to the Mayor of Houston was sen-
tenced to two years probation, fined $10,000 and a special
assessment of $100 for pleading guilty to conspiracy to commit
84Hobbs Act extortion. Former Cleveland City Councilman Joseph• • • 85
Jones was convicted in the same investigation, and federal prose-
cutors have also looked at a possible relationship between Nate
Gray and former Cleveland Mayor Michael R. White.86
On August 24, 2005, Paul Zambrano, former Councilman and
Mayor of West Long Branch, New Jersey pleaded guilty to one
count of Hobbs Act extortion.87 Zambrano admitted that he ac-
cepted $15,000 in cash to reward him for helping the informant
obtain contracts with West Long Branch and other municipalities
where Zambrano introduced the informant to the other public of-
ficials.88 Zambrano is the fourteenth public official convicted in
Operation Bid Rig.8 In early 2005, criminal charges were also filed
against several other local public officials in Monmouth County,
New Jersey, including the mayors of Hazlet and Keyport and
81. Id.
82. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice (Sept. 2, 2005), available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/usao/ohn/news/02September2005_2.htm (on file with the University of




86. Lutmer, supra note 80.
87. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Former Mayor of West Long Branch Admits
Accepting Bribes for Himself and Others (Aug. 24, 2005), available at www.usdoj.gov/
usao/nj/publicaffairs/NJPress/files/zamb0824_r.htm (on file with the University of Michi-
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council members from Asbury Park, Far Hills, Keyport, Neptune
Township, Middletown, and West Long Branch.90
Not to be outdone by New Jersey, the summer of 2005 was a par-
ticularly busy one for public corruption in Pennsylvania. Former
Philadelphia City Treasurer Corey Kemp was sentenced to ten years
in prison for selling his office,9 and Ted LeBlanc, the Mayor of
Norristown, Pennsylvania, was indicted for allegedly taking a
$10,000 bribe.92 State Senator Vincent Fumo is under investigation
by a federal grand jury for his relationship with a non-profit or-
ganization and possible document destruction.93 Another federal
grand jury has indicted Philadelphia Councilman Rick Mariano,
who among other things, is suspected of having his credit card bills
paid by associates in the private sector.94 Mariano has been charged
with honest services mail fraud, honest services wire fraud, money
laundering, conspiracy, bribery, and filing a false tax return.915 U.S.
Attorney Patrick L. Meehan said: "I'm disappointed.., to find cor-
ruption as pervasive as it is .... People on the street tell me ...
they feel it's a way of doing business. And when you see ... whole
departments playing by a different set of rules, some of that is con-
firmed. ,
96
This brief survey of alleged and proven public corruption reveals
several trends. First, public corruption is a serious and pervasive
problem.97 Improvement in all aspects of combating public corrup-
tion, including deterrence, detection and prosecution, is necessary.
As U.S. Attorney Meehan made clear, the level of public corruption
in the United States is higher than even someone in his position
would expect. Second, there are relatively few federal criminal
statutes under which corrupt public officials are charged. Hobbs
Act violations, mail fraud, and RICO all make frequent appear-
ances in the headlines, and in total there are probably fewer than
ten federal criminal statutes that are used with regularity.9 Because
so few statutes are used to prosecute corrupt state and local offi-
90. Id.
91. John Shiffman, Probing Corruption, U.S. Not Yet Contented, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER,
Aug. 8, 2005, at Al.
92. Keith Herbert & Jeff Shields, Norristown Mayor Is Indicted, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER,
July 27, 2005, at B5.
93. Shiffman, supra note 91.
94. Id.
95. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Philadelphia City Councilman Rick Mariano
and Five Others Indicted, at 1 (Oct. 25, 2005), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/
pae/News/Pr/2005/oct/MarianoNewsmemo.pdf (on file with the University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform).
96. Shiffman, supra note 91.
97. See Public Corruption, supra note 2.
98. See supra Part I.
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cials, amending them to improve their effectiveness should be a
relatively simple matter. Third, there were people involved in all
major public corruption investigations that knew of wrongdoing
but did nothing. Sometimes they later become cooperating wit-
nesses, either through agreements with the prosecutors, or for the
sake of their own conscience. However, it is clear that some people
could come forward earlier but choose to not do so. Therefore,
what is needed to improve the deterrence, detection, and prosecu-
tion of public corruption is an amendment to the statutes most
frequently used to prosecute those crimes, which will provide an
incentive for those individuals to come forward and share their
information with the appropriate authorities at a much earlier
stage of investigation.
II. THE Qui TAM CAUSE OF ACTION
A. Origins of the Qui Tam Action
Generally speaking, qui tam statutes confer standing on third
parties, allowing them to sue on the government's behalf, where
otherwise only the government, as the injured party, would have
standing to sue. The phrase "qui tam" is short for "qui tam pro dom-
ino rege quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur," which translates as
"who pursues this action on our Lord the King's behalf as well as
his own." 99 Statutes authorizing qui tam actions date back at least to
the fourteenth century.00 The early English qui tam statutes would
typically prohibit some conduct and authorize private parties to
enforce the prohibition by suing on behalf of the Crown.1° If the
lawsuit succeeded, the private party, known as a "relator" or "in-
former," would be entitled to a share of the damages or civil
penalties paid by the defendant. 2
99. Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 768 n.1
(2000).
100.. Id. (noting the phrase dates from "at least the time of Blackstone"); Trevor W.
Morrison, Private Attorneys General and the First Amendment, 103 MICH. L. REv. 589, 599
(2005).
101. Morrison, supra note 100, at 599-600.
102. The terms "relator" and "informer" are generally used interchangeably in the con-
text of qui tam actions, with "relator" being the preferred term in the United States. Id.
While some commentators distinguish the two, see, e.g., Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of
Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1394-1409 (1988), this
Note will not do so, and to avoid the perception that a distinction is being made, will only
use the term "relator."
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Initially, qui tam devices were also employed by private parties
seeking to be heard in one of the royal courts on matters not per-
taining to a particular statute. In order for a royal court (as
opposed to local court, which had jurisdiction over most private
wrongs) to hear a case, it was necessary to allege that the King had
an interest in the matter. As the allegation of a royal interest was
eventually abandoned, so too were common law qui tam actions,
leaving only the statutory variety with us today."'
Qui tam actions were also common in the early days of the
American republic, 4 although they were never as widespread in
the United States as they once were in England.' 5 The First Con-
gress enacted six statutes that expressly authorized suits by private
relators, which, if successful, would entitle both the relator and the
United States to a share of the recovery.10 6 Three federal qui tam
statutes over 100 years old remain on the books today, along with
two other statutes that suggest a private cause of action without ex-
pressly authorizing one.'0 7 However, given the limited scope of
those statutes, it is not surprising that the False Claims Act is the
only federal qui tam statute with its roots in the eighteenth or nine-
teenth century that has generated a large number of cases and
which remains important today.08
103. See generally Note, The History and Development of Qui Tam 1972 WAsH. U. L.Q. 81, 85
(1972).
104. See Adams v. Woods, 6 U.S. 336, 341 (1805) (noting that "[a]lmost every fine or
forfeiture under a penal statute may be recovered by an action of debt [a qui tam action] as
well as by information" [a government action]).
105. J. Randy Beck, The False Claims Act and the English Eradication of Qui Tam Legislation,
78 N.C. L. Rav. 539, 553 (2000).
106. Evan Caminker, Comment, The Constitutionality of Qui Tam Actions, 99 YALE L.J.
341, 342 n.3 (1989) (collecting statutes).
107. Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 769 n.1. See 25
U.S.C. § 81 (2000) (providing a cause of action and share of recovery against persons con-
tracting with Indians in an unlawful manner); 25 U.S.C. § 201 (2000) (providing a cause of
action and share of recovery against persons violating Indian protection laws); 35 U.S.C.
§ 292(b) (2000) (providing a cause of action and share of recovery against persons falsely
marking patented articles). See also 18 U.S.C. § 962 (2000) (providing for forfeiture to in-
former of a share of vessels privately armed against friendly nations, but not expressly
authorizing a private cause of action); 46 U.S.C. § 723 (2000) (providing for a share to the
informer of the forfeiture of vessels removing undersea treasure from the Florida coast to
foreign nations, but without expressly authorizing a private cause of action).
108. Beck, supra note 105, at 555.
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B. The False Claims Act
The modern use of qui tam actions in the United States can trace
its roots to the mid-nineteenth Century. In the first years of the
Civil War, the Union Army suffered as a result of fraudulent sales
by government contractors. For example, the army had received
small arms that could not be fired, and artillery shells filled with
sawdust rather than explosives,"' as well as rancid food, lame ani-
mals,"' and moth-eaten blankets." In 1863, the War and Treasury
Departments, along with President Lincoln, urgently requested
Congress to enact legislation to facilitate the prevention and pun-
ishment of fraud in connection with the procurement of supplies
for the Union Army. 2 The result was the first iteration of the fed-
eral False Claims Act (FCA) . This original act imposed civil and
criminal liability for presenting false claims against the govern-
ment, for preparing a written instrument that contained
fraudulent statements to aid in the payment or approval of such a
claim, and for conspiring to defraud the government by obtaining
payment for a false claim.1 4 The Act provided for forfeiture of
$2,000 for each violation of the act, along with double the amount
of the government's damages. Individuals were permitted to bring
this action on behalf of the government, and if successful, were
entitled to half of the government's recovery.1 The original FCA
remained in force for eighty years before being challenged.
During World War II, abuses by prospective relators led to the
restriction and near-repeal of the FCA.16 In 1943, Morris Marcus,
upon learning of a contractor's plea of nolo contendere to a bid-
rigging conspiracy, copied the government's indictment into an
109. Id.
110. Corp. Crime Reporter, The Top 100 False Claims Act Settlements 2 (Dec. 30, 2003),
http://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/fraudrep.pdf (on file with the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
111. The False Claims Act: History of the Law, http://www.allaboutquitam.org/
fca.history.shtml (last visitedJuly 2, 2006) (on file with the University of MichiganJournal of
Law Reform).
112. Pamela H. Bucy, Game Theory and the Civil False Claims Act: Iterated Games and Close-
Knit Groups, 35 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 1021, 1022 (2004); The False Claims Act: History of the Law,
supra note 111.
113. Act of Mar. 2, 1863, § 3, 12 Stat. 698 (amended 1943).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. See generally Beck, supra note 105, at 556-61.
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FCA complaint and won a judgment for $315,000.117 The Supreme
Court upheld the award, noting that the government's policy ar-
guments would have been better addressed to Congress. 118
Anticipating this result, Attorney General Francis Biddle wrote to
Congress, complaining that qui tam suits had become "parasitical
actions," and were sometimes brought only after a government in-
vestigation.119 Both houses of Congress voted to repeal the qui tam
provisions of the FCA." ° However, the House bill was not passed
until the next session, necessitating a second vote in the Senate.12'
When the House bill reached the Senate Judiciary Committee in
1943, only one senator strongly supported keeping the FCA, and it
looked as though the FCA would be repealed.2 2 However, Senator
William Langer's outspoken position that some defense contrac-
tors were "endanger[ing] the lives of our soldier boys" moved the
committee to amend the FCA rather than repeal it outright.'
2 3
To address the problem of relators like Marcus enriching them-
selves without providing any benefit to the public, while at the
same time maintaining the Act's deterrent, compensatory, and pu-
nitive aspects, Congress amended the FCA to deny jurisdiction to
federal courts in qui tam suits based on allegations known to the
government before the qui tam complaint was filed.2 4 Additionally,
the 1943 amendments provided that the relator had to provide
supporting evidence to the Department of Justice, which then had
sixty days to decide if they wanted to take exclusive control of the
lawsuit.25 Most dramatically, the amended FCA did not provide for
a minimum fixed recovery, and set the maximum recovery for a
relator at ten percent if the government intervened, and twenty-
five percent if it was prosecuted privately.
26
Although the 1943 amendments may have succeeded in prevent-
ing unscrupulous relators from recovering windfalls under the
FCA, courts interpreting the 1943 amendments also made publicly
117. United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 558 (1943) (Jackson, J., dissent-
ing).
118. Id. at 546-47.
119. S. REP. No. 77-1708, at 2 (1942).
120. See H.R. 1203, 78th Cong., 89 CONG. REc. 2800-01 (1943) (passed by House); S.
2754, 77th Cong., 88 CONG. REc. 9138 (1942) (passed by Senate).
121. Id.
122. See 89 CONG. REC. 7572 (1943) (statement of Sen. Van Nuys).
123. See S. REP. No. 78-291, pt. 2, at 1(1943).
124. See An Act to Limit Private Suits for Penalties and Damages Arising out of Frauds
Against the United States, Act of Dec. 23, 1943, ch. 377, 57 Stat. 608 (1943).
125. Id. If the Department ofJustice intervened, but did not prosecute the action with
"due diligence" over a period of six months, the relator could regain control of the lawsuit.
Id. at 608-09.
126. Id. at 609.
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beneficial lawsuits under the FCA more difficult to commence. 7 In
response to public pressure to stem a perceived wave of fraud
against the government in the mid-1980s, 2 1 the FCA was amended
again in 1986129 to expand the pool of potential relators, enhance
the incentives offered to them, and reduce the burden of proof on
the plaintiff.2 0 Additionally, the 1986 amendments permit the rela-
tor to remain actively involved in the case, even if the government
does elect to intervene."'
Currently, the FCA imposes civil liability upon any person who,
inter alia, "knowingly presents... to an officer or employee of the
United States ... a false or fraudulent claim for payment or ap-
proval."'32 If found liable, the defendant may be required to pay a
penalty of not less than $5,000 and not more than $10,000 per
claim, plus three times the amount of the damages sustained by the
government as a result of the defendant's actions. 3 s An action aris-
ing under this statute may be commenced in one of two ways. The
government, through the Attorney General, may bring an action
127. SeeS. RET. No. 99-345, at 4-5 (1985).
128. In 1985, the Department of Defense reported 45 of the top 100, including nine of
the top ten defense contractors were under investigation for multiple allegations of fraud.
The False Claims Act: History of the Law, supra note 111.
129. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (2000).
130. A.B.A. SECTION OF PUB. CONTRACT LAW PROCUREMENT FRAUD COMM., QuI TAM
LITIGATION UNDER THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT 1-12 (Howard W. Cox & Peter B. Hutt II eds., 2d
ed. 1999); William E. Kovacic, Whistleblower Bounty Lawsuits as Monitoring Devices in Govern-
ment Contracting, 29 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1799, 1801-07 (1996).
131. The relator's control over the course of the lawsuit plays a significant role in the re-
lator's incentive to bring the action in the first place. In one case in which the government
had intervened, the relator objected to a proposed settlement for $234,000. See Gravitt ex rel.
United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 848 E2d 190, 190 (6th Cir. 1988) (noting that the United
States and General Electric each appealed the order of the district court rejecting the rec-
ommendation of the magistrate judge that the court accept the proposed settlement, and
also noting that the relator moved to dismiss both appeals); Gravitt v. Gen. Elec. Co., 680 F.
Supp. 1162, 1162-65 (S.D. Ohio 1988) (noting proposed settlement). The case was later
settled with permission of the relator for $3.5 million, of which the relator kept $770,000, or
twenty-two percent of the government's recovery. PAMELA H. BUCY, WHITE COLLAR CRIME,
CASES AND MATERIALS 715 (2d ed. 1998).
132. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (1) (2000). Section 3729(a) presents seven distinct scenarios
for which a person may be found liable under the False Claims Act: Presenting a false claim
for payment or approval; making or using a false record to obtain fraudulent payment or
approval; conspiring to defraud the government by getting a false claim paid or approved;
having control of property intended for use by the government, concealing such property,
or willfully delivering less property than that for which the person receives a receipt; making
a receipt for property to be used by the government, without knowing the information on
the receipt to be true, intending to defraud the government; knowingly receiving property
from a government officer who may not sell or pledge the property; knowingly making a
false record to decrease an obligation to the government. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)-(7).
133. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a).
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on its own behalf,3 4 or a person may bring a qui tam civil action "for
the person and for the United States Government... in the name
of the Government."
35
If the action is commenced by a person, the complaint is filed in
camera and must remain under seal for at least sixty days. 36 The
government is granted sixty days to determine whether to inter-
vene and proceed with the action from the time it receives both
the complaint and the material evidence and information. 37 If the
government elects to proceed with the action, it assumes primary
responsibility for prosecuting the case, but the relator may remain
as a party to the action. 3 If the government elects not to proceed,
the relator may proceed with the action, subject to the govern-
ment's later intervention with good cause and permission of the
court. 39 In addition to necessary expenses and attorneys' fees and
costs, the relator is entitled to fifteen to twenty-five percent of the
recovery if the government intervenes or twenty-five to thirty per-
cent of the recovery if the government does not intervene. In any
case, no more than ten percent if the information the relator pro-
vides is publicly available.
Because the sums that the government can seek are normally
quite large, the share given to the relator can often be quite sub-
stantial. The largest recoveries under the FCA include a $731.4
million judgment and another separate $631 million settlement,
both from HCA, Inc., the country's largest for-profit hospital chain,
as well as a $559 million settlement from TAP Pharmaceutical
Products, Inc. 4 1 In total, over $15 billion was recovered under the
FCA between the 1986 amendments and the end of fiscal year
2005, including $9.6 billion recovered under the qui tam provi-




134. See 31 U.S.C. § 37 30(a) (2000).
135. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1). In Vt. Agency v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765
(2000), the Court upheld the Article III standing of relators to sue in the name of the gov-
ernment.
136. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) (2).
137. Id.
138. See 31 U.S.C§3730(c) (1).
139. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c) (3).
140. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1)-(2).
141. Taxpayers Against Fraud Education Fund, Top 20 Cases, http://www.taf.org/
top20.htm (last visited July 2, 2006) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law
Reform).
142. Taxpayers Against Fraud Education Fund, Statistics (2005), http://www.taf.org/
fcastatistics2006.pdf (on file with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
143. Id.
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Qui tam actions under the FCA are most common in certain in-
dustries. During the 1980s and early 1990s, many actions under the
FCA were directed at defense contractors, just as they were in
1863.144 More recently the Act has been used most successfully to
fight fraud in government health care programs, 14 particularly
Medicare. 4 6 Relators recovered nearly $280 million for actions in-
volving fraud against the Department of Health and Human
Services in fiscal year 2003 alone. 47 In addition to the defense and
healthcare industries, the FCA is also used frequently against gov-
ernment procurement fraud, grant fraud, municipal bond fraud
and fraud in agricultural subsidies and other programs.148
C. Current Trends in Qui Tam Litigation and Legislation
Since the 1986 amendments, there has been an explosion in qui
tam litigation. While the FCA was much ignored between 1863 and
1943, and little used between 1943 and 1986, over 4,000 cases have
been filed under the FCA's qui tam provisions since 1986.141 Many
states have also enacted similar laws, some modeled on the FCA. 50
144. Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson LLP, Fraud Statistics-Department of Defense
(Oct. 1, 1986-Sept. 30, 2005), http://www.ffhsj.com/quitam/pdf/stats-dod.pdf (on file
with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform); Taxpayers Against Fraud Education
Fund, What is the False Claims Act & Why Is It Important?, http://www.taf.org/whyfca.htm (last
visitedJuly 2, 2006) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
145. What is the False Claims Act and Why Is It Important, supra note 144.
146. Id.
147. Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson LLP, Fraud Statistics-Health and Human
Services (Oct. 1, 1986-Sept. 30, 2005), http://www.ffhsj.com/quitam/pdf/stats-hhs.pdf (on
file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
148. Phillips & Cohen LLP, Common Types of Fraud Against the Government, http://
www.allaboutquitam.org/fcaother.shtml#research (last visited July 2, 2006) (on file with the
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
149. Dykema Gossett PLLC, Litigation Law Developments: Sixth Circuit Affirms Dismissal of
Qui Tam Actions for Failure to Plead Fraud with Particularity (on file with the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
150. Phillips & Cohen LLP, State Qui Tam and False Claims Laws for Whistleblowers, http://
www.allaboutquitam.org/statelaws.shtml (last visitedJuly 2, 2006) (on file with the University
of Michigan Journal of Law Reform); Taxpayers Against Fraud Education Fund, State False
Claims Acts, http://www.taf.org/statefca.htm (last visited July 2, 2006) (on file with the Uni-
versity of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). Currently, twenty states and the District of
Columbia have enacted statutes similar to the federal FCA. Arkansas has a law that provides
for a bounty, but does not permit a relator to initiate a lawsuit; those of Colorado, Connecti-
cut, Michigan, Louisiana, Tennessee, and Texas apply only to medical assistance fraud. See
ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 20-77-901 to -911 (West 2006); CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 12650-12655 (Deer-
ing 2006); COL. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 26-4-1101 to -1104 (LexisNexis 2006); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 53-440 to -445 (LexisNexis 2006); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 1201-09 (LexisNexis
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Additionally, the cities of Chicago and New York have their own
local false claims laws.
5'
At the state level, the trend has been to expand the scope of qui
tam litigation.5 2 Five states allow government employees to file qui
tam actions, so long as they first reported the fraud to the govern-
ment and the government failed to act in a reasonable time. 53 At
the federal level, the trend has been to export the qui tam action to
other areas of law where it might be useful. This trend has been
particularly effective in the area of environmental protection,54 but
Congress has also created private rights of action in various other
areas as well. A federal private right of action against a state gov-
ernment official for public corruption would be consistent with
both of these trends; first, because many actions against govern-
ment officials would likely be filed by government employees, and
second, because qui tam actions are a particularly useful tool
against shared problems which can be difficult to detect. This has
already been noted in the context of environmental protection,
but would also apply to public corruption.
III. A PROPOSAL FOR REFORM
Part I of this Note illustrated the problem of public corruption
in both state and local government. 56 Part II outlined the basic
principles of the qui tam action.' Now, Part III proposes that they
be joined. Federal criminal statutes used to prosecute state and
2006); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 2-308.03-.21 (LexisNexis 2006); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 68.081-.092
(LexisNexis 2006); HAW. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 46-171 to -179, 661-21 to -29 (LexisNexis 2006),
740 ILL. COMp. STAT. ANN. §§ 175/1-175/8 (LexisNexis 2006); IND. CODE § 5-11-5.5 (2005);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 46:439.1-440.3 (2000); MASS. GEN. LAWs ch. 159, § 18 (2000); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. 400.610a-611 (LexisNexis 2006); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 357.010-250
(LexisNexis 2006); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 167:61 (b)-(e) (2004); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-14-1
to -15 (LexisNexis 2006); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 71-5-181 to -186 (2000); TEx. HUM. RES. CODE
ANN. §§ 36.001-117 (Vernon 2006); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 26-20-1 to -13 (2000); VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 8.01-216.1 to -216.19 (2000).
151. Cm., ILL., MUN. CODE § 1-21-010 to -22-060 (LexisNexis 2006); N.Y. City, N.Y., Lo-
cal Law 53 (May 19, 2005).
152. Dan L. Hargrove, Soldiers of Qui Tam Fortune: Do Military Service Members have Stand-
ing to File Qui Tam Actions under theFalse Claims Act?, 34 PUB. CONT. L.J. 45, 93 (2004).
153. Id.
154. See Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1982) (authorizing
private lawsuits against polluters to compel compliance, and against the EPA to compel
discharge of enforcement duties); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1982).
155. See, e.g., Clayton Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 26 (1982); Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1982).
156. See supra Part 1.
157. See supra Part II.
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local public corruption"' should be amended to include a qui tam
cause of action against state and local officials for violations of
those laws. 5 9 Qui tam actions offer a compelling response to a seri-
ous problem. The governmental interest in combating public
corruption is significant. However, the time, expense, and detailed
analysis necessary to procure an indictment for public corruption,
let alone a conviction, calls for a search for alternative means of
pursuing public corruption cases. 6° Whistleblowers who are able to
supplement the work of the Department of Justice would provide
such an alternative. However, whistleblowing can have severe per-
sonal consequences. 6 ' The question then becomes how to induce
the potential whistleblower-relator to share the necessary informa-
tion. Some significant inducement is clearly necessary.
The answer is that we must strengthen the many to discover the
few whom power has corrupted.16 The system of reward offered by
the qui tam action will be able to provide such an inducement, al-
though it will necessarily be somewhat modified from the form it
takes in the FCA. Besides the improved detection and prosecution
of public corruption, the addition of qui tam actions to criminal
statutes would improve deterrence of corrupt acts and increase
public confidence in the democratic system by providing a feasible
method for direct intervention by members of the public at large.
158. Those statutes used to prosecute officials in Part I, supra, including the Hobbs Act,
18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2005), mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2005) wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1343
(2005), and RICO, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (2005), would be a good starting point, and be-
cause of their prevalence in these prosecutions, may in fact be sufficient. However, I do not
intend to exhaustively list all those statutes that could or should be amended in this way. The
Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (2005) and 18 U.S.C. § 666 (2005) might also be appropriate to
amend.
159. What this Note proposes here would be specifically limited to state and local offi-
cials, and any damages resulting would be paid out of state or municipal treasuries.
Application to federal officials, although probably a good idea, is beyond the scope of this
Note. The qui tam provisions this Note proposes would not be applicable to private entities,
including state contractors.
160. See Erica H. McMahon, Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. Federal Elec-
tion Commission: A Flood of Party Dollars To Wash Away Campaign Finance Laws, 6 GEO. MASON
L. REv. 365, 391 (1998) (noting the difficulty in proving bribery and corruption); Kenneth
Mann, Why Corruption is Hard to Prosecute, JERUSALEM POST, January 30, 2004, at 13. Mann
discusses difficulties prosecuting public corruption in Israel, which are equally applicable in
the United States, including gathering evidence, public pressures, budgetary constraints,
defense tactics, piecing together circumstantial evidence to form a case, the difficulty in
encouraging witnesses to come forward, and the years necessary to gather and evaluate the
necessary documents and witness statements.
161. See Edward T Ackerman, Note, A Partnership With the Government?: How the Inclusion
of Attorney Contingency Fees in a Plaintiffs Gross Income Negatively Impacts Qui Tam Litigation, 70
BROOK. L. REV. 213, 229 (2004).
162. See HOFFER, supra note 1.
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Moreover, the qui tam action as an inducement to whistleblowing in
public corruption is superior to other forms of inducements be-
cause it provides for a significant measure of control over the
action to the individual whistleblower.
A. The Need to Combat Public Corruption
"When a public official abuses his office, he drains the reservoir
of public trust on which our democratic institutions rely."163Justice
Brandeis once noted "if the government becomes a lawbreaker, it
breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto
himself; it invites anarchy., 164 The importance of combating public
corruption was recognized in the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. Up-
ward departures for convicted corrupt public officials were
permitted where "the court finds that the defendant's conduct was
part of a systemic or pervasive corruption of a governmental func-
tion, process, or office that may cause loss of public confidence in
government."'165 Recently, the Supreme Court has held that the
governmental incentive in combating public corruption to pre-
serve public confidence in the democratic system outweighs even
the strong First Amendment issues at play in the political process.166
B. Private Attorneys General
In the context of the FCA, Congress intended to supplement the
nascent prosecutorial powers of the Attorney General by allowing
private parties to bring actions in the name of the government.
Here, the prosecutorial powers of the Attorney General are clearly
no longer nascent, but they are similarly limited. Private attorneys
general-here the qui tam relator-would provide a way for prose-
cutors to "gain access to high-level, detailed, inside information
about wrongdoing" and provide "a mechanism for private parties
163. Press Release, U.S. Dep't ofJustice, supra note 7, at 2.
164. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis,J, dissenting).
165. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2C1.1 n.7
(2005).
166. SeeMcConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 143-45 (2003).
167. Ara Lovitt, Note, Fight For Your Right to Litigate: Qui Tam, Article I, and the President,
49 STAN. L. REv. 853, 856 (1997).
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and their counsel to supplement [prosecutors'] resources." How-
ever, enlisting the aid of a prospective relator may be more difficult
than the actual prosecution.
C. Inducement of Relators and Potential Benefits
Senator Charles Grassley has said "Whistleblowers frequently risk
everything when bringing false claim cases." 69 Although qui tam
relators are protected from adverse employment actions under the
FCA,"7° there are still significant risks and burdens facing potential
relators under any qui tam action. "Public disclosure of the filing of
the complaint, in spite of the rights provided by [the FCA], will
often result in termination of that relationship or in a compro-
mised opportunity for future advancement.".7 Additionally, if the
complaint results in suspension of a government contract, the rela-
tor's ability to find similar work elsewhere in the same industry may
be jeopardized .17 'The relator's personal life may become difficult
as a result of the action as well.
17 3
Although the protections against direct retaliation in the FCA
are necessary to the effectiveness of the Act, and no doubt would
work similarly if transplanted to the criminal law, they are not suffi-
cient to overcome the institutional hostility, or the possibility that
filing an action would preclude advancement within an entire in-
dustry. 174 Institutional hostility would likely be even more
pronounced in the political arena, where loyalty to one's party is
168. Bucy, supra note 112, at 1026. Cf Alexander Dyck et al., Who Blows the
Whistle on Corporate Fraud? (Nov. 2005), available at http://www.law.umich.edu/
CentersAndPrograms/olin/papers/Fall%202005/morse.pdf (unpublished draft on file with
the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (finding employees are at least as impor-
tant as regulators in discovering fraud in the corporate setting).
169. Medicaid Waste, Fraud and Abuse: Threatening the Health Care Safety Net: Hearing Before
the S. Comm on Finance, 109th Cong. (2005) (opening statement of Sen. Charles Grassley,
Chairman, Senate Comm. on Finance), available at http://finance.senate.gov/hearings/
statements/062905cgb.pdf.
170. The FCA prohibits discharge, demotion, suspension, and harassment resulting
from an employee's status as a relator. If such retaliation occurs, the relator is entitled to all
relief necessary to make him whole, including reinstatement with seniority, double back pay
with interest, compensation for special damages, costs, and attorney's fees. 31 U.S.C.
§ 3730(h) (2000).
171. United States ex rel. Stillwell v. Hughes Helicopters, Inc., 714 F. Supp. 1084, 1099
(C.D. Cal. 1989).
172. Id.
173. Ackerman, supra note 161, at 230.
174. Id.
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often necessary for advancement. "Selling out" one's boss would
likely spell the end of a burgeoning political career.
In discussing the difficulties faced by relators generally, the Elev-
enth Circuit has explained:
[A] qui tam relator suffers substantial harm .... First, a qui
tam relator can suffer severe emotional strain due to the dis-
covery of his unwilling involvement in fraudulent activity.
Moreover, the actual or potential ramifications on a relator's
employment can be substantial. As several courts have recog-
nized, qui tam relators face the Hobson's choice of "keeping
silent about the fraud, and suffering potential liability (and
guilty consciences), or reporting the fraud and suffering re-
percussions . . . ." Finally, the relator can suffer substantial
financial burdens as a result of the time and expense involved
175in bringing a qui tam action.
Therefore, if a potential relator is professionally well-placed, he
will likely only initiate a qui tam action if the expected gains from
the lawsuit outweigh the expected gains from a continued career.176
Without a sufficient financial incentive, the costs of voluntary re-
porting of illegal activity may outweigh the benefits. 77 In the
government context, where power is as much an object as money,
the financial returns must be even greater.
Currently, there is very little incentive for individuals with
knowledge of public corruption to come forward. 78 Indeed, if the
prospective relator is not in danger of possible prosecution and has
any hopes of political advancement herself, there is a very great
disincentive to report official misconduct. Therefore, the addition
of a qui tam provision to existing federal criminal statutes would
not only provide an avenue for the reporting of public corruption
it would also, and most importantly, provide an incentive for its
use.
Because detection of public corruption would be supplemented
by insiders, the prosecution of public corruption would likely im-
prove as well. Clearly, the more that is known to the prosecutor,
and the better their access to inculpatory evidence, the easier a
175. United States ex rel. Neher v. NEC Corp., 11 E3d 136, 138 (lth Cir. 1993).
176. Ackerman, supra note 161, at 230.
177. See id.
178. The FBI has "corruption hotlines" and it is possible to leave an anonymous tip.
However, absent a personal fear of prosecution, and one's own sense of civic duty, there does
not appear to be any incentive to use them. See Public Corruption, supra note 2.
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case will be to prove. 79 Because the crimes public officials are
charged with are often complex or technical, 8 ' the testimony of a
relator-witness may have a significant influence on ajury. Improved
prosecution would also reduce the frequency of "cover-up" crimi-
nal charges brought in lieu of charges for underlying, but difficult-
to-prove crimes."'
As a result of both improved detection and prosecution of pub-
lic corruption, many corrupt acts may be deterred. Currently, the
deterrent effect of indictment and prosecution for public corrup-
tion does not appear particularly effective.'82 However, the addition
of qui tam actions may increase deterrence in at least two ways.
First, public officials may be deterred from committing illegal activ-
ity because of the increased likelihood that one of his
co-conspirators will "sell him out" as a result of the incentives
offered under the qui tam provisions."" Second, the increased flow
of information into the US. Attorneys' Offices would likely dimin-
ish the impact of the investigatory burden that frequently precedes
public corruption prosecutions.14 Because of the prosecutors' in-
creased access to evidence, their cases are likely to be stronger, and
convictions easier to obtain. Public officials may therefore be de-
terred from criminal activity due to the increased likelihood of
criminal prosecution and conviction, above and beyond their de-
terrence due to qui tam actions generally. In short, the official
might be sold out, and if he is, there is an increased likelihood that
he will be prosecuted and convicted.
8
5
There would also likely be positive secondary effects resulting
from qui tam actions against corrupt public officials. As soon as a
state pays out its first large settlement or judgment to a relator, the
state legislature is likely to commit more funding and authority to
179. Cf Mann, supra note 147.
180. See, e.g., Second Superseding Indictment of Lawrence E. Warner & George H.
Ryan, Sr., No. 02 CR 506 (April 2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/iln/indict/
2003/warner.ryan.pdf (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform);
McMahon, supra note 147, at 391 (noting the difficulty in proving bribery and corruption).
181. See Stuart P. Green, Uncovering the Cover-up Crimes, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 9, 9, 12
(2005).
182. See id. at 12 (noting U.S. Attorney Meehan's statement regarding the pervasiveness
of public corruption).
183. The General Accounting Office estimates over $300 billion in fraud was deterred
as a result of the FCA between 1986 and 1998. Hargrove, supra note 152, at 47. It does not
seem unreasonable to expect a significant deterrent effect from qui tam actions in the public
corruption arena as well, provided there is an equally attractive inducement for the relator.
184. See Mann, supra note 160.
185. After all, it is the corrupt acts that are problematic. If they do not occur in the first
place and there is no need for prosecution, so much the better.
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its inspector general's office. As a practical matter, qui tam actions
would have the effect of making public corruption more costly
than its prevention. Additionally, a strong inspector general would
also increase the deterrence factor outlined above.
Secondly, as a cumulative result of all the foregoing outcomes,
public confidence in the democratic system is likely to improve.
People will have more faith in a system that they feel they have
more influence over, corrupt acts will be deterred as a result of the
qui tam actions, and those officials who do engage in corrupt acts
and are sued under the qui tam provisions will likely face greater
penalties, or at least a greater chance of penalties, than they oth-
erwise would. On the whole, state and local governments will be
more cleanly run, and individuals will have more faith in democ-
racy because everyone is empowered and nearly everyone would be
willing to bring a qui tam action if they encountered public corrup-
tion.
Lastly, if charges of public corruption are based on the
accusations of those close to the defendants, accusations of politi-
cally-motivated prosecutions will likely decline. 186 Moreover,
prosecutions of public corruption which are in fact politically
motivated will likely decline as well, as the impetus for government
intervention would now come from the relator. Either way, lessen-
ing the potential for political prosecutions and for false accusations
of political prosecutions would serve the public good by strength-
ening public perception of neutrality and fairness in the criminal
justice system.187
D. Alternative Measures
A final consideration in the calculus to adopt qui tam provisions
as part of the criminal federal code governing state and local pub-
lic officials is the availability and propriety of alternative measures
that might accomplish the same goal. Although the proposal pre-
sented in this Note may be novel in its reliance on private parties to
initiate civil actions that will likely lead to criminal prosecution,
186. Cf NORMAN ABRAMS & SARA SUN BEALE, FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS EN-
FORCEMENT 147 (3d ed. 2000) (noting "potential for politically motivated prosecutions");
Michael Powell, Scandals P/ague Governor, B. GLOBE, Aug. 8 2004, at A7 (noting the Democ-
ratic Governor of New Jersey has accused the Republican U.S. Attorney of bringing charges
against him to further his career).
187. See generally Sandra Caron George, Prosecutorial Discretion: What's Politics Got To Do
with It, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 739 (2005) (noting deleterious effects of political consid-
erations in prosecutorial discretion).
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statutes supporting the involvement of the public in investigations
and prosecutions are by no means uncommon.' as Two devices quite
similar to the qui tam action are the general "private attorney gen-
eral" action found in a number of statutes (and of which a qui tam
action is one type), and the "bounty system" notably employed by
the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC). Although both are
excellent prosecutorial tools, in this situation, the qui tam action is
the best method to combat public corruption.
1. Private Attorney General Statutes-Despite its frequent use, the
phrase "private attorney general" is not particularly well defined.
8 9
It is used to refer to both plaintiffs and defendants; both attorneys
and clients.'90 However, its most frequent use may be to designate
"'bounty hunters,' unharmed by the asserted misconduct to pur-
sue the public good through asserting a 'public right' on behalf of
the general public or the sovereign. " 19'
Professor William Rubenstein has identified three distinct forms
of private attorney generals: those who substitute for the Attorney
General, those who supplement the work of the Attorney General,
and those who simulate the work of the Attorney General.' 92 "Sub-
stitute" attorneys general "literally perform the exact functions" of
the Attorney General's office, although they are not themselves the
Attorney General.9 This could be a private attorney hired to do
the work of the Attorney General, such as the appointment of
David Boies to try the Microsoft antitrust case by Deputy Attorney
General Joel Klein.' 94 Additionally, a substitute attorney general
exists when a public official hires a private attorney to represent
her in her official capacity. '5
The "simulated" attorney general falls on the opposite end of
the public/private spectrum.90 Rather than a hired gun who does
188. See, e.g., Clayton Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 26 (2000); Federal Water Pollution
Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2000); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e (2000); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (2000).
189. William B. Rubenstein, On What a "Private Attorney General" Is-And Why It Matters,
57 VAND. L. REv. 2129, 2130 (2004).
190. Id.
191. John H. Beisneretal., Class Action "Cops": Public Servants or Private Entrepreneurs , 57
STAN. L. REv. 1441, 1458 (2005).
192. Rubenstein, supra note 189, at 2142.
193. Id. at 2143.
194. Id.
195. Id. Although Professor Rubenstein includes qui tam relators among the types of
substitute attorneys general, see id. at 2144, it is the supplemental, rather than the substitute,
function of the qui tam relator that makes them valuable in detecting public corruption. See
id. at 2146-47 (discussing environmental citizen-suits).
196. Id. at 2156.
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the government's work, the "simulated" attorney general does his
own work, on behalf of private clients, which also happens to vin-
dicate a public interest.97 Frequently, the attorney, representing an
individual plaintiff, will secure a fund for the benefit of a group of
individuals.19 Recouping this fund for private clients is not typically
a public function, although the attorney is typically awarded fees
and costs because the action is deemed to be a contribution to the
public good.'"
Neither the "substitute" attorney general nor the "simulated" at-
torney general provide any more support to federal prosecutors in
the investigatory phase of prosecution than the Justice Department
could do by itself. Only the second, or "supplemental" category, in
which qui tam relators are classified, is useful for combating public
corruption. Without the additional information made available by
a qui tam relator, the detection and prosecution of public corrup-
tion is not enhanced and the deterrent effect remains unchanged.
2. The Bounty System-The bounty system, in contrast to private
attorney general statutes, does not allow for a private cause of ac-
tion. Section 21A(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
authorizes the SEC to award a bounty to a person who provides
information leading to the recovery of a civil penalty from an indi-
vidual engaged in insider trading.2°° However, as applied by the
SEC, there are several limitations that would make it difficult to
apply to public corruption. First, and perhaps most obviously, the
bounty is limited to civil actions. Second, the bounty is limited tobouny i li ie  t i l "20
ten percent of the recovery.2 This poses three problems: first in
the context of public corruption, damages are far more difficult to• • 203
calculate. Second, it may take relatively little to induce a bounty
hunter to report a securities violation where the repercussions are
small, but a substantial reward will be required to overcome the
potentially life-altering consequences of reporting public corrup-• 204
tion. A third concern with the bounty system is the possibility of
non-payment. Under the SEC rules, the SEC is not obligated to pay
any bounty.2 5 Additionally, if the defendant is judgment-proof, the
197. See Rubenstein, supra note 189, at 2154.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 2155.
200. The Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-l(e) (2000).
201. The Department ofJustice prosecutes criminal insider trading.
202. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Bounty Program at the SEC, http://
www.sec.gov/answers/bounty.htm (last visited July 2, 2006) (on file with the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
203. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
204. See discussion supra Part III.C.
205. Bounty Program at the SEC, supra note 202.
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whistleblower would also get nothing, because the bounty comes
out of the SEC's recovery.06 All of these concerns would severely
limit the utility of a provision applied to criminal public corrup-
tion, as gathering the information hinges on the inducement to
the prospective relator. 7 Finally, qui tam is a superior alternative to
a bounty because it allows the relator to bring an action and be-
come a party to the proceedings rather than a supplier of
information. The additional control over the proceedings govern-
ing his own payment is likely to positively influence a potential
relator's participation in uncovering public corruption, which
could simultaneously jeopardize his career.
This is not to say that in the process of molding the qui tam ac-
tion to fit the needs of public corruption, the result would be
unlike either a private attorney general action or a bounty system.
In certain ways, it may resemble all three devices. For the sake of
simplicity, it appears that the qui tam action is the best model for
this scenario. However, certain changes will need to be made to the
qui tam action to account for differences unique to federal prose-
cutions of public corruption in state and local governments.
IV. How TO FIT A SQUARE PEG INTO A ROUND HOLE
To be sure, the qui tam provisions of the False Claims Act cannot
simply be grafted on to existing criminal statutes in toto. There are
many differences that must be accounted for and modified before
qui tam could be employed successfully and constitutionally against
public officials. First, there is a question of the proper role of the
federal government in the prosecution of state and local public
officials. Second, there is a question of federal jurisdiction if indi-
viduals are allowed to sue state officials in federal court. Third,
unlike the False Claims Act, damages in these types of cases are in-
tangible, and far more difficult to calculate than in a case of
procurement fraud. Fourth, there may be an issue of conflicts of
interest where public officials gain privately from knowledge ob-
tained in the course of their official duties. Finally, there may also
be a question of fairness to the public in paying qui tam relators out
of public funds. Although these are all valid concerns, they either
206. Id.
207. See discussion supra Part III.C.
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may be avoided by modifying the qui tam action, or are outweighed
by the potential benefits of this proposal.
A. Federalism Concerns
1. The Proper Role of the Federal Government-Clearly, the federal
government has an interest in minimizing corruption within its
own ranks."' The President takes an oath to "preserve, protect and
defend" the Constitution. A democratic government has a duty to
uphold the demarcation between public and private markets. Like
any employer, the federal government can determine the compen-
sation of its employees, and it may attempt to instill an attitude of
honest public services. It may also prosecute corrupt acts as such as
embezzlement and theft as crimes against society at large, regard-
less of its status as a victim. 20 9 However, the interest and legitimacy
of federal prosecution of corrupt state and local officials is more
tenuous. Assuming no federal funds are involved, what federal in-
terest is there in preventing corruption in sub-national
government?
One answer offered by Professor Brown is that the prosecution
of state and local government is a part of the federal government's
"fundamental national role" in preserving the democratic system.210
The conduct of government is something that the public views in
unitary terms .21 Therefore, because corruption at a sub-national
level can adversely affect confidence in the federal government
and in the democratic system as a whole, prosecuting corruption at
the state and local level is a proper function of the federal gov-
ernment. 212 This was demonstrated recently by the Supreme
Court's decisions in Sabri v. United States
2" and McConnell v. FEC.214
In these cases, the Court confirmed the ability of the federal gov-
ernment to "fight corruption at any level in order to protect the
democratic process and public confidence in it."215 In McConnell,
the Court held that the federal government's "interest in combat-
ting [sic] corruption outweighs the powerful First Amendment
208. George D. Brown, Carte Blanche: Federal Prosecution of State and Local Officials After
Sabri, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 403, 408-09 (2005).
209. Id.
210. Id. at 410.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600 (2004).
214. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
215. Brown, supra note 208, at 404.
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interests at play in the political process. ''21 6 In Sabri, the Court held
that the same governmental interest also outweighs a state's inter-
est in prosecuting state and local officials.217 In both cases,
assurance of governmental integrity was given paramount impor-
218tance.
Additionally, the federal government has an interest in prevent-
ing public corruption in one city or state from harming the
interests of another state or of the federal government.219 "Corrup-
tion in, say, industrial permitting in state A may harm the rigor and
integrity of the permitting process in state B." 20 For example, B's
corrupt laxity may cause officials in A to look the other way, or lose
businesses to B. Local or state police corruption could threaten
joint law-enforcement initiatives, and widespread economic failure
due to corrupt local officials could have a national impact.
22'
The constitutional basis of the federal government's interest in
combating state and local corruption has been advanced in differ-
ent ways. Professor Henning contends that "[t]he Constitution
reflects the deep concern of the Founders with preventing corrup-
tion ... a concern that supports congressional power to reach
misconduct by officials at all levels of government for misuse of
public authority.2 22 This "anti-corruption legacy" supports broad
interpretation of congressional power to enact statutes to combat
corruption at the sub-national level, regardless of whether the
states could enact similar legislation. 23 In particular, the Seventh
Amendment's civil jury guarantee and Article III's provision for
federal diversity jurisdiction are intended, inter alia, to reduce the
possibility of corruption and favoritism arising out of court pro-
ceedings.224
The Guarantee Clause also provides footing for federal involve-
225
ment in combating state and local corruption. Professor Kurland
has noted:
216. Id. (referencing McConnell 540 U.S. at 660-61).
217. Id. at 404-05.
218. See id. at 405.
219. Id.
220. Brown, supra note 208, at 410.
221. Id.
222. Peter J. Henning, Federalism and the Federal Prosecution of State and Local Corruption,
92 Ky. LJ. 75, 81 (2003).
223. Id. at 82.
224. Id. at 89-90.
225. U.S. CONST., art. IV, § 4, cl. 1 ("The United States shall guarantee to every State in
this Union a Republican Form of Government.").
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The primary federal interest in combating local corruption
... is based on the principle that the public is entitled to
honest government at all levels. The faith that the citizenry
places in all levels of government is the foundation of the re-
public. Thus, anything that erodes that foundation is of
substantial federal interest.2
26
There is very little that erodes a republican form of government
221more than corrupt officials. 7 Moreover, the Guarantee Clause can
be seen as conceptually distinct from the limited and enumerated
powers of the federal government.28 The Guarantee Clause can be
seen as a positive command that the federal government preserve
the conditions necessary to a functional federal republic. 9
Although the constitutionality of federal prosecutions does not
appear to be in jeopardy, the propriety of such prosecutions is the
subject of some debate. One argument against federal prosecu-
tions is that the states and the federal government (Supremacy
Clause aside) are co-equal sovereigns, and the prosecution of
agents of one sovereign by another is incompatible with this divi-
sion of power.230 As a result, state actors are more accountable to
the interventionist federal government than to their own constitu-
ents, and have much less incentive to combat corruption on their
231own.
This shift of responsibility to the federal government of public
corruption prosecutions may risk the imposition of "federal" values
232on state actors. Professor Hills argues that the democratic values
at the federal level reflect implementation of policy by professional
bureaucrats, whereas the "participatory populism" which character-
izes state and local government is more likely to include officials
who also have full-time private interests . 2 " Thus, public and private
interests are more intertwined in sub-national political processes,
and federal prosecution of corruption, particularly of crimes such
as criminal conflict of interest, may not accurately reflect commu-
226. Adam H. Kurland, The Guarantee Clause as a Basisfor Federal Prosecutions of State and
Local Officials, 62 S. CAL. L. REv. 367, 376-77 (1989).
227. See id. at 417, 429.
228. Id. at 429-35.
229. See id. at 432-35. However, the Supreme Court has historically viewed the Guaran-
tee Clause primarily as a source of state autonomy than as a source of federal power. See, e.g.,
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898,918-19 (1997).
230. See Brown, supra note 208, at 412.
231. Id. at 411-12.
232. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Corruption and Federalism: (When) Do Federal Criminal Prose-
cutions Improve Non-FederalDemocracy ?, 6 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 113, 137-44 (2005).
233. Id. at 115.
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nity norms, which may be more accurately represented by existing
state law.
24
While this analysis may toll sharply in the debate on federal
prosecution of state and local officials, its application to federal qui
tam actions for violations of federal law by state and local officials is
much less clear. It appears that the major factor weighing against
federal prosecution is that it removes the power to decide what to
criminalize and who should prosecute from the hands of the peo-
ple. But rather than return this power to the states by
de-federalizing corruption prosecutions, this proposal goes one
step further and returns it to the people themselves. Under this
proposal, state and local officials are completely accountable to their
constituents and the judges of community norms are individual
members of the community. Whatever problems may arise from
federal prosecution of state and local corruption, if such prosecu-
tions arose out of qui tam actions, they would be likely be seen as
more legitimate, rather than less so.
2. State Sovereign Immunity-Although it has been established, if
not entirely accepted, that the federal government may properly
combat state and local corruption, it is far from established that
private citizens may sue states in federal courts. The Supreme
Court has articulated a principle of state sovereign immunity which
is affiliated with, but not bound by, the Eleventh Amendment.23'5 As
a result, private individuals are not permitted to sue states in fed-
eral court.236 This presents an obstacle in the way of enforcing qui
tam actions against states, which are traditionally thought of as pri-
vate attorney general actions. If a qui tam action was brought by an
individual alone against a state in federal court, the claim would be
dismissed. 3
Although Congress may not empower private individuals to en-
force federal legislation against unconsenting states, Congress may
authorize the federal executive to do so.25 Current qui tam proce-
dure under the False Claims Act requires the federal government
234. Id. at 137-44.
235. Morrison, supra note 100, at 619.
236. The Eleventh Amendment provides that the 'Judicial power of the United States
shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of
any Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI. However, the Supreme Court has also consis-
tently held that suits by citizens of a state against their home state in federal court are also
barred by the Amendment unless the state consents to the lawsuit. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of
Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363 (2001); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996).
237. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
238. Morrison, supra note 100, at 620.
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to investigate each case that is filed, and decide if the government
will intervene.239 A logical solution to this jurisdictional hurdle ap-
pears to be mandating the involvement of the federal government
in every case brought under this proposal, if the government can
pursue the action in good faith. The benefits of the qui tam action
would remain intact, while providing a jurisdictional basis for the
cases to be heard in federal court. Moreover, granting the govern-
ment a provisional power of dismissal would likely reduce
predatory lawsuits that necessarily accompany qui tam actions.24°
The Supreme Court held in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florid
2 4t
that Congress cannot abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant
to its power under the Commerce Clause or unilaterally abrogate
the sovereign immunity of unconsenting states.242 Because a great
deal of federal criminal law, including many of those laws used to
prosecute state and local public corruption, are based on the
Commerce Clause, it would also likely be necessary to base this
proposal allowing for qui tam actions against state public officials
243on some other power of Congress.
A likely source of congressional authority to enact this proposal
would be the Spending Power. 4 Congress is authorized to "lay and
collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and Excises to pay the Debts and
provide for the common Defense and general Welfare of the
United States., 245 Given the Supreme Court's history of deference
to Congress's interpretation of the "general Welfare," a qui tam ac-
tion designed to combat corruption in state and local governments
239. See 31 U.S.C.A. § 3130(b) (West 2003).
240. See Bucy, supra note 112, at 1026 ("Because qui tam actions empower private par-
ties-regardless of their ability or ethics---to bring significant lawsuits against businesses in
the name of the United States, they are subject to abuse."); Pamela H. Bucy, Private Justice, 76
S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 62-68 (2002).
241. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44.(1996).
242. Id. at 57-73. There are two main theories of 11th Amendment interpretation: sub-
ject matter jurisdiction and common law immunity. See generally Douglas C. Melcher, State
Sovereign Immunity and Judicial Review of Interconnection Agreements Under the Telecommunications
Act of 1996, 8 COMMLAw CONSPEcTus 61, 67 (2000). The theory that is chosen may deter-
mine which powers Congress may use to abrogate state sovereign immunity. Id.
243. For example, both the mail fraud and wire fraud statutes contain language invok-
ing the commerce power. See 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2000) ("any private or commercial interstate
carrier"); 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2000) ("by means of wire, radio, television communication in
interstate or foreign commerce"). The Hobbs Act also requires an effect on commerce as a
jurisdictional predicate, see 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2000), and interstate or foreign commerce is
an element of a RICO violation, see 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)-(c) (2000). See also Stephen Chip-
pendale, Note, More Harm than Good: Assessing Federalization of Criminal Law, 79 MINN. L. REV.
455 (1994).
244. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
245. Id.
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does not appear beyond the scope of the Spending Power.2 46 This is
confirmed by the Court's recent decision in Sabri v. United States.
217
"For the Court ... the crucial determinant was the National Gov-
ernment's ability to protect funds it had disbursed under the
spending power by ensuring the integrity of the recipient of those
funds. 248 By linking qui tam actions to the Spending Power,49 Con-
gress would be able to ensure that states, as recipients of federal
funds, were not frittering the money away, or delivering less than
dollar-for-dollar value to their citizens through corrupt acts.
2 
0
Moreover, the Spending Power allows states to retain the option to
forgo whatever federal funds are linked to the qui tam statute.
Thus, those states and state officers bound by the federal law would
not be "unconsenting" under Seminole Tribe.
Finally, this proposal should also name states as permissible de-
fendants. Although municipal governments are "persons" subject to
qui tam liability,12 states and state entities generally are not.5 When
Congress creates statutory language that would unilaterally abrogate
state sovereign immunity and "alter the usual constitutional balance
246. Brown, supra note 208, at 421.
247. Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600 (2004).
248. Brown, supra note 208, at 406.
249. For example, by providing that qui tam actions may be initiated by any person
against any officer of any state which receives more than $10,000 per year of federal fund-
ing, who has violated one of the listed federal criminal statutes.
250. Sabri, 541 U.S. at 606. Alternatively, a basis for federal jurisdiction might be found
in an extension of Ex parte Young. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). "The Ex parte
Young doctrine is a well-established method for circumventing the state sovereign immunity
defense." Melcher, supra note 242, at 78. A federal court may exercise jurisdiction over a
lawsuit against a state officer if the suit seeks only prospective relief in order to "end a con-
tinuing violation of federal law." Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985). However, here
the plaintiff would be seeking damages, not injunctive relief, and a "continuing" violation of
federal law would likely be difficult to show.
251. Congressional acts pursuant to the spending power are as a general matter not coer-
cive on the states. See e.g., Sabri, 541 U.S. at 608; South Dakota v. Dole, 438 U.S. 203, 207 (1987)
(noting an act pursuant to the spending power must only be in pursuit of the general wel-
fare, enable states to exercise their choice knowingly, and perhaps bear some relation to an
important federal interest, in order to avoid coercion). Moreover, a "[s] tate's freedom from
suit without its consent does not protect it from a suit to which it has consented." Parden v.
Terminal Ry. of Ala. State Docks Dep't, 377 U.S. 184, 186 (1964). Additionally, by offering
states a choice, the spending power avoids potential commandeering problems under Printz
v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (holding the federal government may not issue
directives to states or command state officers to enforce federal law); see also New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167-68 (1992) (holding that under the spending power, Con-
gress may encourage states to implement federal policy by offering incentives and
disincentives that influence legislative choice).
252. Cook County v. United States ex rel. Chandler, 538 U.S. 119 (2003).
253. Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 787 (2000)
(holding states and state entities are not "persons" subject to qui tam liability under the False
Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-33 (2000)).
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between the States and the Federal Government, [Congress] must
make its intention to do so unmistakably clear in the language of
the statute."2 54 However, because the states would consent to theS 255
abrogation, this specificity is only advisable, not required.
B. Measuring Damages
Under the False Claims Act, damages are fairly easy to calculate.
The government has paid a certain amount and has received some-
thing less than what they have paid for, or a defendant has asked
for reimbursement greater than what they are entitled. Procure-
ment, health care, and grant fraud all cause tangible losses. Public
corruption is quite different. The losses suffered as a result of cor-
rupt public activities cannot easily be measured, particularly when
a significant injury is public confidence in the democratic system.
How then are qui tam actions to compensate the government and
the relator?
The most obvious solution is to provide for statutory damages.
Statutory civil penalties are already in place in the Federal FalseS 256
Claims Act, and nearly all state equivalents. However, under the
False Claims Act, the relator's recovery is the percentage of treble
damages paid by the defendant.57 Because there may be no meas-
254. Will v. Mich. Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989) (internal quotation and
citation omitted); see also Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 73 (2000) (noting the
intention of Congress to abrogate state sovereign immunity must be "unmistakably clear")
(internal quotation and citation omitted).
255. In instances where Congress acts unilaterally to abrogate state sovereign immunity,
there is a parallel requirement that Congress must be acting "pursuant to a valid exercise of
its power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment." Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538
U.S. 721, 726 (2003). Like the specificity requirement, it is recommended that the statutory
language meet this standard, but because states grant their consent, it is not required. Re-
gardless, efforts to combat state and local level public corruption would likely fall within
Congress' power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of due process.
256. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(7) (2000); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 20-77-903(a)(1) (West 2006);
CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12561 (Deering 2000); COL. REV. STAT. ANN. § 26-4-1104(1)(b) (II)
(LexisNexis 2006); DEL. CODE ANN. § 1201 (a) (7) (LexisNexis 2006); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 2-
308.14(a) (LexisNexis 2006); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 68.082(2)(g) (LexisNexis 2006h); HAw.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 661-21 (a) (8) (LexisNexis 2006); IND. CODE 5-11-5.5-2(b) (8) (2005); 740
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 175/3(a)(7) (LexisNexis 2006); LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§§ 46:438.6B.(1) (2000); MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 159, § 18 5B(9) (2000); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 400.610a(15) (LexisNexis 2006); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 357.040 (LexisNexis 2006);
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 167:61-bI (2004); TENN. CODE ANN. § 71-5-182(a)(1)(D) (2000);
TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 36.039(c) (2) (A)-(B) (1997); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 26-20-1 to -
13 (West 2006); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-216.3(A) (7) (2000).
257. The average recovery for a relator in all cases where there is a recovery is over $1.1
million, whereas the statutory civil penalty is capped at $10,000 per violation. See 31 U.S.C.
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urable damages, unusually high statutory damages may be neces-
sary to make up the difference between what damages can be
measured and what is necessary to induce a relator to commence
an action.
C. Public Officials, Private Gain
Another concern is the propriety of public officials privately
profiting from information they obtain in the course of their offi-
cial duties. Because the proposal targets public officials, it is likely
that some potential relators will also be public officials, simply by
virtue of their vantage point within a state or municipal administra-
tion. Several false claim suits have been filed by federal employees,
although courts have diverged on their standing. The Eleventh
Circuit, joined recently by the Tenth Circuit, has held that federal
employees may prosecute qui tam actions subject to the same re-
quirements as any other relator.'5" In contrast, two circuits have
dismissed False Claims actions by government employees. The First
Circuit has held that certain government employees cannot have
"independent knowledge" because their job, e.g. auditor, is to ob-
tain the knowledge that forms the basis for the lawsuit. 59 The
Ninth Circuit has gone even farther, holding government employ-
ees that do not voluntarily provide the information to the
government are barred from bringing a claim.5 ° In the states, the
trend appears to be towards allowing state employees to bring qui
261
tam actions against the state.
While these cases are instructive, the inquiry here differs some-
what. Rather than an objective interpretation of an existing statute,
what is necessary is a more normative inquiry into whether anyone
should be exempted by statute from bringing an action under this
proposal. As the First Circuit noted, government employees whose
duty is to investigate fraud and corruption, such as the staff of an
inspector general or auditor general, should not be able to recover
§ 3729(a) (7) (2000); Robin Page West, Employment Law: How a Qui Tam Whistleblower Case
Works (July 1999), http://www.expertlaw.com/library/employment/qui-tam.html (on file
with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
258. United States ex rel. Holmes v. Consumer Ins. Group, 318 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir.
2003); United States ex rel. Williams v. NEC Corp., 931 F.2d 1493, 1501 (11th Cir. 1991).
259. United States ex rel. LeBlanc v. Raytheon Co., 913 F.2d 17, 20 (1st Cir. 1990).
260. United States exrel. Fine v. Chevron, U.S.A., 72 F.3d 740, 743-44 (9th Cir. 1995).
261. Hargrove, supra note 152, at93.
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in qui tam for finding exactly what they are employed to find.2 62
This exemption would prevent taxpayers from having to pay for
the same result twice. Other exemptions may be appropriate as
well, but too many exemptions could limit the pool of potential
relators to the point where the deterrent effect is significantly less-
ened.
CONCLUSION
Public corruption at the state and local levels is a continuing and
serious problem for government at every level. A significant and
determined response is necessary. Because acts of public corrup-
tion are often known by multiple individuals, they are well-suited to
measures aimed at rewarding those individuals for coming forward
with incriminating information. However, it is often extremely dif-
ficult for individuals in possession of such information to do so.
The qui tam action offers a significant response which also affords a
measure of control over the proceedings to the relator, so that he
can ensure that his sacrifice will not go unrewarded. Because of the
ease with which a corrupt public official could be reported to the
authorities, and because of the incentive offered under this pro-
posal, the detection, prosecution, and deterrence of public
corruption should improve as a result.
262. See generally LeBlanc, 913 F.2d at 20 (holding that government employees who are
employed to uncover fraud cannot pass the "independent knowledge" jurisdictional bar of
31 U.S.C. § 3730(e) (4) because "the fruits of [their] effort belong to [their] employer-the
government"); Dorothea Beane, Are Government Employees Proper Qui Tam Plaintiffs?, 14 J.
LEGAL MED. 279, 280 (1993).
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